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SOME
REMARKS
ON THE
LETTERS

Between the

L—d T-----nd,

AND

Mr. Se---tary B--le.

IN A

SM
LETTER

TO THE

AUTHOR

OF THE

Remarks on the *Barrier-Treaty*.

L O N D O N,

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REMARKS

ON THE

LETTERS

RELATIVE

TO THE

AND

Mr. Secretary B. A.

IN A

LETTER

TO THE

AUTHOR

OF THE

Remarks on the Law of Trade

LONDON

Printed by J. B. Smith, at the Sign of the Anchor, in St. Paul's Church-yard, 1712.

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S O M E
R E M A R K S
O N T H E
L E T T E R S

B E T W E E N T H E

Lord T----- E N D

A N D

Mr. Se---tary B --- L E.

S I R,

Y O U must excuse me, when I tell
you, I hardly ever met with a
greater Disappointment from any
Author, than from your self; and
I know not whether I were more surpris'd
at first, to find the incomparable Author of
The Conduct of the Allies, so unlike himself; or,
upon a second Perusal, to find a Book that
contained so many Truths in the Body of

it, should set out with what may justly be suspected not to be one, on the Title Page : Which is Fact I know not ; but neither can be much for your Credit ; for if you are the Author of *The Conduct*, &c. too, you have neither done your Self, nor Cause Justice, in letting so unfinish'd a Piece, upon such a Subject, come from so able a Hand ; and, if you are not, I am sure you did neither a Service, by entering the Lists under the Armour too weighty for you to bear ; for the raising our Expectation so high, as you did by prefixing that Title to your Book, serv'd only to sink your Performance even below it self.

Not that I would be misunderstood by this, as if I were arraigning you of imposing upon the World with either Falsties or Trifles ; I allow the Facts you have stated are True ; and your Remarks Just : I only complain of the Disappointment, that they are neither so many as they should have been, nor enforc'd and explain'd with that Vigour and Clearness, which we justly expected from that Author. And I own too, by what you have produc'd, that the Fault seems more to be owing to want of Care, than Ability in your self ; therefore I shall not offer at any Criticisms or Amendments to what you have done, but only touch up-
on

on some few Omissions, of what was very obvious for you to have taken notice of, and point out a few Heads for Observations, which if either you, or any other skilful Pen, would yet take the Pains to set forth in their true Lights and proper Colours, I dare say they would produce a second Part of *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty*, and the Conduct of it more useful and entertaining than the First.

The first Omission I shall charge you with is, The not producing the Letters (which we are now beholding to the consummate Wisdom and Goodness of the Honourable *H-se of C—ns* for) between my Lord *T—nd* and the then Secretaries of State. Was it not gross almost to an Absurdity, that you should take the Pains to collect the Sentiments of Prince *Eugene* and Count *Zinzendorff*, and omit the printing of these Letters; which, of themselves, without any Comment, so plainly detect and demonstrate those *villainous Grounds* upon which this Treaty was at first commenced, and by what *bold, unwarrantable Methods* it was afterwards carry'd on, and at last obtain'd almost a forced Ratification? They set the whole Affair in such a Light, that a very small degree of Pains, only in pointing out the observable Passages in them,

them, would have been sufficient to have made the blindest Bigot to Whiggism plainly see, that there are no *Measures so desperate*, no *Designs so destructive* to the Honour or Well-being of their Q—n and Country, which *their Leaders* have not chose to enter into, and carry on, rather than not support their then tottering Power here at Home. Let the rankest Whig in Britain read my Lord T——nd's Letter to Mr. Se——tary B——l of November the 26th, towards the latter end of the 4th Paragraph, and tell me, whether he is not satisfied, that *the keeping the Dutch steady to the carrying on the War*, was not the very Basis upon which this Treaty had its first Foundations? and whether all the *Traiterous Concessions* afterwards made to the giving up the Q——n's Honour and the *British Trade*, were not yielded to by her Ambassador, *without Her Consent, or even Privy*, merely to prevent the Dutch from agreeing to so good a General Peace, as France was then not only Offering, but Suing for? And if that be so, what is a more plain Consequence, than that the Miseries which must attend a War, such as the Burthen of heavy Taxes to the Gentry, the breaking of the wealthy Merchant, and the starving of the poor Manufacturer,

facturer, are *no Considerations to a W—g Ministry*, when the good Old Cause is to be carry'd on? What is more plain, than that the *Price*, at which the late Ministry were content to buy of the *Dutch* the Continuance of the War, was no less than *sacrificing both of our Honour and Trade to them?* And as adverse as they pretend to be to Peace at present, they would be glad to make One to Morrow, if the present Ministry would buy it of them at *half the Price*. No Body, surely, now can help seeing the Reason, why the *Dutch* so rudely interposed with Her Majesty's Measures, when She had Intentions of removing *those Ministers* from Her Councils; since they had, by Experience found, how much the *Interests of Britain* would be sacrificed by them, *more* than they could hope for from any other Set of Men, whoever should succeed them. Let him consider, that Monsieur Rouille and the Marquis de Torcy had been at the *Hague* the very Spring before, settling Preliminary Articles; wherein the *French* agreed to *those*, whereby the *Queen's Title to the Crown*, and the *Protestant Succession* were to be acknowledged, without making the least Scruple or Hesitation at it; and tell me fairly, whether, he is not convinced, that this Guaranty

ty of the Q—n's and Successor's Title is not a *mere Pretence*, and made Use of as a Skreen only to the *abominable Designs*, which *those who delight in War*, are afraid as well as ashamed to own; and that the *real Guaranty* of this Treaty, was, not that the States should preserve the Queen upon *Her Throne*, or the E——r of H——r in the *Succession*, but the *then Ministry* in their Power, which we fatally find they keep too strict an Observance of.

What true Briton can reflect upon the Peremptoriness, and the *menacing Insinuations* of the *Pensionary*, complain'd of in Mr. B——l's Letters of the 18th and 26th of November, 1709. and what *vile Condescensions* were us'd in carrying on this Treaty, which gives the *Dutch* the Possession, or at least the Power of taking the Possession, whenever they shall please, of a Countrey twice as Big and as Rich as their whole former Dominions were; which subjects all our *Flemish Trade* to *their Mercy*, and raises *their Trade* to the whole *Spanish Dominions* to a *better*, and puts *Ours* on a *worse footing* than it was at the beginning of the War, and not feel his Blood boil with Indignation! Let him consider the QUEEN of Great Br——n not only brought to consent, but to Beg and Truckle to the *Mena-*

ces of a P——ry of *Holland*, to obtain
such a Treaty, and by that let him explain
 the *Fidelity* of the *late Ministry*, both to
 their Q——n and Country.

You have quite omitted, what was a
 very proper Subject for your Pen, to ex-
 pose as well the Weakness, as something
 else that's worse in our Plenipotentiary;
 which appears so very visibly throughout
 the whole Course of this Negotiation:
 How handsomly and severely ought you
 to have lash'd that audacious Piece of Fol-
 ly and Temerity, in venturing to sign *the*
Article so very injurious to our Trade; not
 only without any *Authority from the Queen*
 so to do (which some sort of Principles,
 and perhaps the like Usage to Her Ma-
 jesty, in other Cases, had made less terrible
 to him than it ought to have been) but
 without the *Advice* even of his *own Friends*
the Council too! I say, without enlarging
 upon the Wisdom or Justifiableness of *such*
a Conduct, how plainly could you have
 pointed out, from almost every Line of
 his own Letters to Mr. B——le and my
 Lord P——nd, that the P——ry Over-
 reach'd him in every Step that was taken?
 What *weak Arguments* were allow'd by him
 for *sufficient Reasons*, to induce him to as-
 sume to himself a more than Regal Au-
 thority,

thority, and to *convince* him, that *Dendermonde*, with the *Fort St. Donas*, and *Philippe*, were a *reasonable and necessary part of a Barrier for Holland against France*; and that 'twas impossible they could ever be made *use of for a Barrier against our Trade to Flanders and Germany*? The contrary of which is not only demonstrable, but so apparently true, that one would hardly have thought it possible, that any Man who had either Knowledge enough to be able to read a Map, or Honesty enough to enquire after their Situation, could suffer himself to be so grossly impos'd upon. Then again, *The Granting the Revenues to the Barrier Towns, and the Million which is to be rais'd Annually before the Peace to the States, upon an Assurance, They did not intend to make use of that Concession*, is what one could hardly have believ'd his L——dship could have been drawn into, if he had not given it us under his own Hand: And, *his giving up our Privileges in respect of Trade, upon a Presumption only, that the King of Spain would take them away, if he did not give them away*, is such a piece of Conduct in an Ambassador, that, I believe his L——dship will hardly have a Rival in it, if we were to examin the Transactions of all the Embassies that either have been, or
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are now in being, throughout the whole World.

Nor can I help making one more Remark upon that part of his L——dship's Letter to Mr. B——le, which mentions, how *disingenuously* he believes *we were dealt with* by King Charles, the now Emperor's Minister, in regard of our Treaty of Commerce made at Barcelona; and how unkindly we were most certainly *us'd* by them, at the time of this Treaty's being Negotiated in Holland: 'Tis indeed a very melancholy Reflection, to think we should be yet dragg'd on to endeavour to conquer Spain and the *West-Indies* for the Emperor; which (if we could do) might probably be *worse for us in point of Privileges to our Trade* (the only thing wherein we can receive any Advantage by the War) than if they should remain in the Possession of Philip: And if the People of Britain would seriously consider that Declaration which Count Z——ff, by the present Emperor's Orders, made to the *Pensionary*, That his Majesty always intended the *States* should be upon an *equal Foot with us, in Point of Trade, throughout all his Dominions*; whereas before the War, we undoubtedly had *Privileges beyond them*; they would never agree to lose yet more Blood and Mony.

to put our *Trade* upon a worse *Footing* than it was before the beginning of the *War*. If that be the Ambition of the W——gs, and their Love to their Country, much good may it do them. But surely if, in recompence for all this Blood and Treasure, whereby we have purchased *Security* both to the *Emperor* and the *Dutch*, we ask only a few new *Privileges* in a new *Trade*, the Demand must be allow'd to be very modest; and 'tis the highest piece of Ingratitude for the *Dutch* to desire, or the Emperor to grant; and the highest piece of Parricide in any *Englishman*, to ruin his Country by continuing the *War*, only to obtain, That there shall be no Branch of Trade whatsoever, wherein the *Dutch* shall not have equal *Advantages* with us, whilst they engross the *Spice*, and several other Parts of Trade, wholly to themselves.

Nor have you touch'd upon the Weakness of the Treaty itself, which was certainly worthy your Observation: Indeed, whether we are most oblig'd to his L——dship's Wisdom or Honesty for it, I know not, but in one respect, we are more oblig'd to his Lordship than he imagins; for he has made it so very a Bad one of our side, and so very Good on the part of *Holland*, that perhaps, upon a thorough
Examina-

Examination, and *in strict Justice*, it may be found to be no Treaty at all. There are a sort of Bargains amongst private Men, and upon the same Parity of Reason, there may be Treaties between Princes and States, which, *ab initio*, are *void of themselves*: They are what the *Civilians* express in their Terms by *Fædus Leoninum*, and what our Common Law of the Land calls *Nudum Pactum*; which is, when the Bargain is so made, that all the Advantages are to accrue to *One side* only, and no valuable Consideration to the *Other*. One may be serious and say, that all the Laws in the World do adjudge *such sort of Bargains* not to be *Obligatory*; and if that is granted, I think one may say too, it will not be very difficult to prove, that the *Considerations on our side in this Treaty* are either *nothing*, or what is *much worse than nothing*. What I call *nothing* is, that the *Dutch* should undertake to assist us to keep Her Majesty, who has at least Ninety nine in the Hundred of all the Hearts and Hands of *Great Britain* entirely at Her Service, in the Possession of Her Throne: And what I call *worse than Nothing*, is, that the *Dutch* should have a Power of coming over hither with an Army, whenever their Confederates, the late Ministry should

should think fit to send them Word (tho' the Fact should be entirely false) that there is some body (tho' in the Clouds) somenting a Sedition and Conspiracy against the Succession in the H——e of H——r. The first, I suppose, will be readily granted, and the last is as easie to be proved: and if any one doubts it, let him give himself the trouble but of taking a Book into his Hands, whether it be *Greek, Roman, French, Spanish or English History*, and leisure to reflect upon the numberless Instances, he will find in every Age and Country, *where the inviting of Foreign Troops into a Neighbour Kingdom, has constantly ended in Misery and Slavery to those, who were so unfortunate to give the Invitation; and I am sure that he will readily agree, that nothing is so terrible, nothing so dangerous, or rather certainly fatal, as to admit a Foreign Army into the Bowels of the K——dom, upon any Colour or Pretence whatsoever.* There is hardly a Country in Europe that hath not made the fatal Experiment: Our Island particularly has severely felt the dismal Effects of such a Folly. When the unhappy Britons heretofore admitted but nine Thousand Germans (and those call'd in to their Assistance too) it ended in nothing less than the

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the entire Loss of both their *Liberty* and *Country* too. I know I must expect to meet with this profound Objection, That though to invite hither *Strangers to our Laws and Religion* might be dangerous, yet the Assistance that is here stipulated for, is only from our good *Friends and Allies, Fellow Protestants*, and a Nation that hath once already sent us her *Assistance*, without *subduing us*. As to the former part of that Argument, I shall, in answer to it, make use of the Authority and Observation of an Author, whom I am sure the Contrivers of this Treaty will allow, was a Man of good Sense and Judgment; I mean the famous *Julian Johnson*, who in one of his Treatises makes this just Remark: *I own, says he, 'tis ridiculous thus constantly to add the Epithet Popish to Tyranny and Slavery; they are Terms that will admit of no Additions; the things are the same, let them come from what Hand they will.* The Remark was just; and certainly what will hold equally good, if apply'd to an Army; no Epithet can make any significant Distinction, *Whether Slavery is the certain Consequence that attends every Army*; and what matters it, be it *French or Dutch, Popish or Protestant*, the thing is still the same; and I desire any Man to produce
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an Instance where a Government was more totally subverted, or a more Nefarious Murder committed, than that by the *true blue Protestant Army of Forty One*. And I believe every Body will allow, that an *Army of Foreigners* may easily be brought to do *as much Mischief*, as One that was form'd out of our own *Countrymen*.

As to the second part of the Argument, that the *Dutch* have already had an Army here *without Conquering Us* (notwithstanding the pious Bi---p of S---m, may perhaps hardly allow it Us) I shall readily own, That the late *happy Revolution* was not a *Conquest*, and that along with the great Good it brought Us, there were less *Mischiefs* introduc'd amongst Us by that Army, than in any other Instance of the like Nature that can be produc'd from History; yet we must not be so partially blinded, but we must own too, that the *Dutch* Guards did *hasten* the then King's Departure from *Whitehall*, and made him Abdiccate at least *sooner* than he design'd; and that *They* carried on the Revolution somewhat *farther* than the good Archbishop *Sancroft*, and five of the seven pious Prelates, that were put in the *Tower*, and several other of the Nobility and Gentry, that were heartily Zealous for their Liberty and

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Religion, *intended it*: And tho' it did not quite overthrow our Constitution, yet it must be allow'd, that it gave *such a shock to it*, that nothing but the *utmost Necessity* can justify: And at last, had it not been for the *miraculous Virtue* of the House of Commons in 97, who in spite of all *Closettings, Places and Pensions*, stood firm to their Resolution of *sending home the Blue-coats*, I know not whether our Liberties might not have been in as much Danger in 1698, as they were in 1688. I mention this not to reflect on the late K--g, but to show the Danger that always attends receiving, even the greatest Blessings from an Army; for which reason, as I thoroughly abhor them, so, I hope, no fear of being thought Disaffected to the Succession, or any other Consideration whatsoever, will ever induce our most Gracious Sovereign, or Her Ministry, to advise Her to suffer *any Foreign Power whatsoever* to be a Guarantee of it. It is already not only strongly secur'd. by the Laws of the Land, which have inflicted no less than the Pains of High-Treason to those that shall endeavour to oppose it; but it hath still a better Security, the Affections and Inclinations of the People, which is the surest, most proper, and most natural Foundation for it to be fixt upon. And who-

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ever

ever shall endeavour to put it upon any other Footing, ought to be esteem'd an Enemy both to *that* and *their Country too*. And I am sure those will be found to be the best Friends to the Protestant Succession, who shall advice the Prince to rely upon the Laws of the Land and the Hearts of his Subjects; for whatever Power shall ever be asserted, or maintain'd over Us, by any thing else than the known Laws of the Land, 'tis the Duty of every Freeborn *Briton*, to oppose it to his utmost, in any and every Method that is consistent with our Laws. And I am sure the putting any Prince whatever upon the Throne of *Great Britain*, by the Power or Assistance of any Army whatsoever, is putting an End to all our Liberties at once, and what every *Briton* ought to think of with the utmost Horror and Detestation.

And I must own, that *this part of the Treaty* is still more shocking, when I consider we have a C---f J---e upon the B---h, who gives it as his Opinion, that 'tis *High-Treason to say the Succession, as it is now settled, is upon any Account alterable, even by the Power that first made it*. For if this Opinion were good *Law*, and this *Treaty good Politicks*, what Mischief might they not, the *One* being supported by the *Other*,
bring

bring upon Us? For tho' nothing can be feared from the Wisdom and Goodness of our immediate Successors the Princess S- -a, or the present E——r, nor the Sons of his E——l H——s, yet suppose God Almighty should afflict the H——se of H——r with such a Mortality, or a greater than he has lately done the Royal Family of *France*, and the remaining Branch of that House, that may be the next in Succession at the time of the Q——n's Death, (whom God long preserve to be a certain Blessing unto Us) should be a Person, either utterly incapable of Government, as an Idior, or very unfit for G——t, as an Infant of a year or two Old; when either the unsettled Condition of *Europe*, or the very well-being of B——n may absolutely require both an active and experienc'd P——ce to be at the Head of it: Or, suppose he should be an utter Bigot to the present Religion of the Family; which tho' they are Protestants, are not yet of the Religion of the Church of E——d, but *Lutherans*; I say, suppose he should be such a Bigot to his Religion, as to think himself as indispensably bound to introduce *Consubstantiation* for a point of Faith, as King *James* did *Transubstantiation*? Or, as all the Princes of *Germany* are absolute in their Dominions, if

any future Prince of that Line, should have shown himself to be an absolute Tyrant at Home, before the Crown of *Britain* should come to devolve upon him ; are we indispensably obliged to accept of a Child, an Infant, a Bigot to *Lutheranism*, or a Tyrant, if God Almighty should inflict such a Judgment on that Family and this Nation, as to suffer the next of that Line that may be, when the Q——n shall happen to dye, to be one of them ? Shall the *Dutch* have the Power of enforcing Us to accept of such a K——g, which would infallibly be utter Ruin and Destruction to Us, and of Consequence, a mighty Advantage to them, both in regard to Trade and every thing else ? These are Possibilities which might happen to Us, were the Politicks or the Law of the late Ministry, infallible. But, thanks be to God, We are not now implicitly obliged to obey either. As to the first, I hope it will be entirely renversed : And as to the Other, if the C——f J——e will give himself the Trouble to peruse the Statute of the 4th of this Q——n, *Cap.* the 8th, I believe he will find himself more in danger of being guilty of H——h T——n, should he give that Opinion under his Hand, which you say he has ventur'd to pronounce. For it is by that Statute enacted,

acted, " That if any Person, by Writing or
 " Printing should affirm, That the Kings
 " or Queens of *England*, by the Authority
 " of Parliament, cannot make Laws to limit
 " and bind the Crown, and the Descent and
 " Government thereof, every such Person
 " shall be guilty of High-Treason; and
 how he can construe that to extend only
 to the making new Limitations, and not
 be applicable to the altering any that are
 already made, he best knows, and had best
 take care.

I am satisfied every Body is convinced
 of the many and mighty Mischiefs that
 may attend this Treaty; and that the Con-
 siderations on our side in it, are either No-
 thing, or what is much worse than No-
 thing; and yet I am affraid to argue too
 strongly, in endeavouring to prove this to
 be no Treaty at all, lest it may seem to
 favour a little too much of *French* Logick:
 However, since the Honourable House of
 C——s have in their Representation
 to Her M——y, desired that it may
 be explain'd and amended; and since the
Dutch in their Letter to Her, have con-
 sented to it; I will content my self with
 hoping, it will receive so many Alterati-
 ons, that in the Second Edition of it, 'twill
 appear so very different from what it now
 is,

is, that it may more justly be called the same from the Title, than the Contents of it: For I hope nothing more will be left of it in Force, than what tends to the equal Security and Advantage of *Britain*; which is, that the *Dutch* may have an undoubtedly secure Barrier assured to them, and *Britain* be allowed her ancient Privileges in Trade, and whatever other new Ones we shall be able to obtain, even in Preference, and without Prejudice to them.

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